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SIXTH CIRCUIT REVIEW 
Johnson v. Ohio Department of Public Safety: Last 
Chance Agreements May Make Claims of Racial 
Discrimination More Difficult to Prove 
ANDRIA DORSTEN EBERT 
A recent Sixth Circuit ruling may make it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to meet their factual burden in employment discrimination cases 
if they have signed a Last Chance Agreement with their employer. A Last 
Chance Agreement (LCA) puts an employee on notice that if prohibited 
conduct continues, or if performance does not improve, they will be 
terminated.  
LCAs do not give employers free rein to terminate employees; 
employers must still comply with applicable federal employment laws, 
such as the prohibition of discrimination contained in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Similarly, “an employee may not prospectively 
waive his or her rights under … Title VII.” Hamilton v. General Elec. 
Co., 556 F.3d 428, 434 (6th Cir. 2009) (the case remanded and tried, and 
in a separate ruling, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of 
the employer. Hamilton v. General Elec. Co., 487 Fed. App’x. 280 (6th 
Cir. 2012)). But even though an LCA does not change a plaintiff’s rights 
under Title VII, it may make it more difficult for a plaintiff to meet their 
factual burden of discrimination under the recent ruling in Johnson v. 
Ohio Dept. of Public Safety, 942 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2019). 
In the Sixth Circuit, the court uses the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework when analyzing Title VII racial 
discrimination claims. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973). This analysis has three parts—first, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving a prima facie case of discrimination; second, if the plaintiff is 
successful in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the 
action; and third, should the defendant carry their burden, the plaintiff 
must then have the opportunity to prove that the proffered reasons were 
a mere pretext for discrimination. Id at 802–804. However, when an LCA 
is part of an allegation of impermissible discrimination, at what point in 
the legal analysis should a court consider its terms? At the outset, in the 
prima facie stage as evidence that claimant and their comparators are not 
“similarly situated,” or later, in the final burden-shifting stage to 
demonstrate that the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the 
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adverse employment action was mere pretext?  
This was the question in front of the Sixth Circuit in Johnson, 942 
F.3d 329. The majority considered the LCA at the outset, affirming that 
the plaintiff and the comparator he used were not “similarly situated.” Id. 
at 331. However, the dissent argued that the LCA should only be 
considered after the plaintiff has met the lower burden of showing a prima 
facie case of discrimination. Id. at 333–34 (Moore, J. dissenting).  
Johnson involves Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper Morris 
Johnson, who was fired for breaching an LCA after he engaged in 
“conduct unbecoming an officer.” Johnson pulled over and arrested a 
female driver for a DUI and told her that he would take her to a nearby 
Waffle House, where “[t]hey make some fantastic waffles.” A month 
later, Johnson again pulled over the same woman, undisputedly without 
probable cause. Johnson admitted that he wished to be friends with her. 
At that stop, Johnson told her he liked her and apologized for not taking 
her to Waffle House after the first stop. After a citizen’s report and 
subsequent investigation, Johnson was found in violation of Ohio Admin. 
Code 4501:2-6-02(I), Conduct Unbecoming an Officer, and was 
recommended for termination.  
To avoid immediate termination, Johnson accepted the conditions 
of the LCA, which stated that if he engaged in similar behavior within the 
next two years, he would be terminated. But Johnson was unable to 
maintain appropriate behavior for the full term of the LCA. Instead, less 
than two years later, Johnson chose to take another DUI arrestee home, 
despite the fact that she had already contacted someone for a ride. He 
stayed at her home for a half-hour in the wee hours of the morning and 
later texted her from his personal cell phone. After another citizen report 
and investigation, Johnson was again charged with violation of Ohio 
Admin. Code 4501:2-6-02(I), Conduct Unbecoming an Officer, and was 
terminated for violating his LCA. 
To demonstrate a prima facie case for racial discrimination, a 
plaintiff must show, among other things, that they were “similarly 
situated” “in all of the relevant respects” to an employee treated 
differently outside of the protected class. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998). In alleging that he was 
discriminated against because of his race, Morris Johnson pointed to 
David Johnson, a white trooper who also engaged in harassment of 
female arrestees. David Johnson had, in two incidences three years apart, 
sent Facebook friend requests while off-duty to female arrestees (the first 
incident was unsubstantiated after investigation). After the second 
incident was substantiated, David Johnson was placed on a one-day 
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suspension but was not subject to an LCA.  
Comparing the incidents, the court had to decide whether Morris 
Johnson was similarly situated to David Johnson in all relevant respects, 
including whether placing Morris Johnson on an LCA constituted 
differential treatment. The majority opinion found that the Ohio 
Department of Public Safety disciplined both troopers differently simply 
because both situations were different. The two troopers’ actions were 
not of “comparable seriousness” and therefore were not similarly situated 
for the purpose of demonstrating that the Department discriminated 
against Morris Johnson when it fired him for breach of his LCA. Johnson, 
942 F.3d at 331. 
But Judge Moore reached a different conclusion in her dissent. 
Judge Moore focused on the low bar plaintiffs must meet in 
demonstrating a prima facie case, noting that it is not the duty of the Court 
on summary judgment to determine whether two parties are “similarly 
situated,” but to determine whether a reasonable jury could find, based 
on the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that they 
are similarly situated. Id. at 335 (Moore, J. dissenting). She found that 
this burden was met because both troopers were disciplined under the 
same provision for the same general conduct: Conduct Unbecoming an 
Officer. Id. Even though each officer was charged with a different sub-
provision (“attempting to cultivate a personal relationship with an 
arrestee” and “attempting to establish a relationship with a female to 
whom he had issued a citation,” respectively) there was no evidence that 
either offense was qualitatively different from the other. Id. 
Generally, Judge Moore noted that the LCA “speaks to the 
sanction for the conduct, not the standard for evaluating the conduct.” Id. 
at 333. Therefore, she found that the LCA was only relevant to the prima 
facie demonstration to the extent that it was a sanction for one officer, 
and not another. Her dissent argued that the context that triggered the 
LCA and its terms should be independently analyzed after the burden 
shifts back to the employer as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the discipline and subsequent termination. Id. at 333–34. In other words, 
both officers were sanctioned for the same infraction—Conduct 
Unbecoming an Officer—but only Morris Johnson was placed on an LCA 
and at risk of immediate termination. Because both violated the same 
standard of conduct but only one was subject to an LCA and later 
terminated, Judge Moore found that both officers were similarly situated 
and that Morris Johnson “satisfied the first stage of the burden-shifting 
framework.” Johnson, 942 F.3d 335 (Moore, J. dissenting). 
In response, the majority found that the standard of “more severe 
 LAST CHANCE AGREEMENTS [Vol. 81  
 
treatment [for] more egregious circumstances” applied to Morris 
Johnson’s conduct. Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 612 (6th Cir. 
2002). Under this approach, plaintiffs may have a higher factual burden 
and need to demonstrate more than just an inequal application of 
sanctions burden to show a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Even 
so, Judge Moore’s dissent serves as a reminder that the plaintiff’s burden 
is intended to be easily met. Employers should take care to evenhandedly 
and rationally apply sanctions when employees violate conduct 
standards.  
 
